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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ERNEST W. COWLEY and 
C. FRANK COWLEY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
J. L. WATTERSON, 
Defendant and Respondent 
RESPONDENTS 
BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE APPEAL in this case appears to be essentially 
on questions of fact. The evidence is conflicting in many 
matters so that the defendant does not agree to the State-
ment of Facts by the plaintiff. 
Some items are admitted. It is admitted that the land 
in question is located approximately one mile west of Lo-
gan and is used to produce, what is commonly referred to, 
as native or wild hay; the map prepared by the Surveyor 
Moser is taken from the present ownership plat of Cache 
County and illustrates the location of the plaintiff's prop-
erty and the right of way of the Railroad Company. It is 
likewise admitted that the Railroad was constructed across 
the property in about the year 1912 or 1914 and that the 
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right of way over the plaintiff's pro~erty was procured by 
condemnaticn proceedings. That during the irrigation 
season there is ample water to irrigate these meadow 
lands, also defend:~Et's lands, and prior to the cqnstruction 
of the Railroad the springs herein referred to as Tarbet or 
Bod:rero and Blue Springs were a part of the waters of 
what is con:m.1only referred to as Swift Spring and Slough, 
the waters of which were decreed to plaintiff and defend-
ants predecessors in interest in what is commonly called 
the Kimball Decree. (Tr. 147, 374) The construction of the 
Railroad cut off the Blue and Tarbet Springs from the 
balance of t?: e waters making up the Swift Spring and 
Slough so that the waters on the South side of the tract 
flowed down in the old channel and the Tarbet and Blue 
Springs flowed down the ditch in the north barrow pit of 
the Railroad right of way. Prior to the construction of 
the Railroad the defendant's predecessors in interest took 
the water out west of the plaintiff's land where it coursed 
North from the Slough over and across the I. P. Stewart 
property, novv South of the Railroad, and on over North 
over the east end of the Stewart property North of the 
Railroad on to what was then the Hebaus property now the 
property of the defendant. (Tr. 89, 246, 350, 351) The 
general slope of the land as to the North of the Railroad is 
to the west and to the north. (Tr. 318) The barrow pit is 
en the south side of the plaintiff's land and there is a ditch 
on the north of plaintiff's land which was cleaned as a 
drain ditch as well as an irrigation ditch and this ditch 
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converges with the water down the barrow pit at the west 
tip of plaintiff's land and runs down the barrow pit to the 
west approximately 150 feet to where it runs under the 
Railroad track at Point 9 on the map. (Tr. 277-8) (For 
photograph of this pipe referred to repeatedly in the rec-
ord as a culvert, see Defendant's Exhibit 14) When there 
is enough water reaching Point 9 to fill the culvert half full, 
the water will run on further down the barrow pit to where 
it intersects the old ditch running across the Stewart land 
to the North over to irrigate approximately 80 acres of de-
fendant's land. (Tr. 311) A dam at the end of this pipe has 
been the chief matter at issue in this case. Defendant also 
takes irrigation water from the Swift Slough lower down to 
irrigate the west part of his property. (Tr. 310) There is 
considerable evidence about the irrigation of these west-
ern lands but we contend none of this evidence is material 
to this case. 
Plaintiff used boards across the end of the pipe to di-
vert the water for several years and later used a steel dam 
that covered the lower half of the pipe which was removed 
by the plaintiff (Tr. 116) and produced by him at the de-
fendant's request and offered as an exhibit in this case. 
All tfie otl:er facts recited by the appellant are controvert-
ed, but it is contended by defendant that the great pre-
ponderance of the evidence support the following: 
Plaintiffs pastured their cattle on the Railroad right 
of way and they traveled down the tract to where it cours-
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ed through the defendant's land and the cattle passed 
through the Railroad fence and trespassed and damaged 
the defendant's crops. Defendant told plaintiff he must 
take care of his cattle and a few days later this action 
was started. (Tr. 295) It is not too easy to understand the 
action because the physical facts do not bear out the claim 
of tt e plaintiff that a dam over a major part of the pipe 
will back up the waters and flood plaintiff's' land. The 
engineer's survey does not substantiate his claim. His sur-
vey (Tr 133-4) establishes the top of the pipe elevation 
93.64 as against grotmd elevation at bridge 93.94. (Tr 179) 
The waters when the pipe is running full will not back onto 
plaintiffs' land ( Tr 179-83) and the evidence as to the fact 
of the flooding was so conflicting that the court himself 
suggested he believed an experiment should be tried to de-
ternline that issue. (Tr 359). 
This action was begun on July 23, 1953 when it is al-
leged the water had been backed up and damaged the 
crops. The next day the defendant took two neighbors as 
witnesses, Mr. Reese and Mr. Ricks. (Tr 250-258; 258-
268). 
Ttey went over the plaintiffs' premises and discovered 
that their meadow was all being irrigated, but upon exa-
mination, none of the water was coming from the barrow 
L;it cr south ditch (Tr 252, 260) but was con1ing from the 
East where the springs, 4 to 6 c.f.s., were diverted from 
the ditch to the east of plaintiffs' property where it spread 
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north and south across the entire meadow of the neighbor 
Johnson and down across the entire 55 acres belonging to 
the plaintiffs. It required boots to inspect the property. 
These meadows are common to this country and the 
customary way to grow crops is to pretty much keep the 
water on them all summer and then turn it off when they 
are ready to cut t1~e hay. Dr. Stewart testified that was 
the custom of plaintiffs for many years. ( (Tr 24 7). 
Pictures taken of the meadow claimed to be damaged 
taken just before the crops were taken show that the ir-
rigated part of the meadow (Defendant's Ex. 12) wa,s well 
up to the knees of the witness while the higher ground (De-
fendant's Ex. 11) was dry and the grass much thiner and 
only about half as high. Defendant's Exhibit 4 is a photo-
graph of the hay cut on the alleged damaged farm where 
the evidence is in direct conflict as to whether this is an 
average or good crop. (Tr 288). 
At or near the Point 9 the plaintiffs maintain a bridge 
or crossing over the barrow pit which is approximately 
75 rods east of the triangular tip of the plaintiffs' lands. 
Defendant's exhibits 6, 9, 16 and 17 are photographs of 
this bridge looking both up and down the stream. Defend-
ant's 16 was taken the same day as defendant's 14 and con-
clusively demonstrates that there was a good fall to the 
West from this bridge at the time when the pipe was run-
ning more than half full. The same condition existed at 
this bridge when tt. e trial test was viewed by the court 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
when the pipe was running within 5 or 6 inches of the 
top. (Tr 405) Defendant testified that was as high as the 
water got when he had tte tin over the pipe. (Tr 296). 
The ditch on the north was cleaned at the joint ex-
pense of plaintiffs, defendant and the neighbor Parley 
Reese on the north and was approximately 19 inches be-
low the surface of the ground on the south so that the wa-
ters running to the ncrthwest off the plaintiffs' meadows 
drained into that ditch and off to the west. (Tr 279). 
The plaintiffs did use the bridge at Point 9 above re-
ferred to also as a dam. They would put small timbers 
down into the n1ud on the upper end of the bridge and then 
haul in a load of straw and manure and throw in above 
these timbers and the water would wash this against the 
upper end of the bridge and back the water up to the east 
and it would then flood out over the north side of the cen-
ter and west part of the plaintiffs land and some of it 
would find its way back into the barrow pit to tl:e west, 
but since the slope of the land was principally to the west 
and north, water that really got very far out on plaintiffs 
land would flow across to the northwest. 
There is a direct conflict in the evidence as to whether 
the pipe was dammed to the top in June and July 1953 and 
as to the length of time it was there. Defendant conceded 
that when the plaintiff took his half dam and defendant 
could not find it he did put a piece of tin across the entire 
uipe but he and his witnesses claimed the water simply 
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ran on down to the west and did not back up to the top of 
the pipe. (Tr 296) Plaintiff claimed he saw it once when it 
was an inch or two over the top of the pipe. (Tr 129). 
The first day of the trial at noon at the suggestion of 
the defendant and the court went down to view the premi-
ses. (Tr 58, 108) This was in February and the pipe was 
tten running a little more than half full. There was no 
flooding but plaintiff complained that this was not a fair 
demonstration because there was no irrigation going on 
down on the defendant's property. 
At the close of the trial with the evidence as to flood-
ing, as well as on other subjects so hopelessly in conflict, 
the trial judge suggested that he view the premises on June 
14, when conditions as to flooding would be more nearly 
like those complained of to better settle the item of dam-
ages. ( Tr 359) . 
Judge Jones did visit the premises on June 14, 1954, 
which was during the irrigation season. Plaintiff com-
plained bitterly then that defendant had cleaned his ditches 
and lowered the bottom of the ditch as much as nine inches 
(Tr 371-3) and said this was not a fair demonstration. The 
judge then directed the defendant to completely cover the 
end of the pipe (culvert) (Tr 411) and a few days later the 
judge again viewed the premises with the pipe completely 
covered, at which time, the water was flowing about 5 or 6 
inches below the top of the pipe. (Tr 405) There was no 
flooding on any of these occasions. And the court held 
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against tl:e plaintiffs on the question of backing the water 
up and flooding the land except for the one item that it 
might have been possible before the ditch was cleaned that 
some slight flooding could have resulted in 1953, and sole-
ly upon that ground allowed the plaintiff $50.00 damages. 
Because of the small amount involved and the conflict in 
the evidence, there was no cross appeal, although the trial 
court indicated he thought there might be one. At page 443 
of the transcript the court stated: 
"THE COURT: Let's see; I want to include in the 
findings that subject to this one time, this June, 
1953, incident: there's been no flooding. I'm find-
ing against you on that." 
ARGUMENT 
Counsel for appellant opened his brief with the state-
ment, "This is a suit for an injunction." This case was 
commenced in July and by fall of that year a second amend-
ed complaint had been filed, and the case did not come on 
for trial until February. At the beginning of the trial 
the court directed an inquiry to counsel whether this was 
a water case with incidental damages or a damage suit, 
(Tr 54) to which Mr. Nelson replied: 
"It's a damage case." 
The Court: "A damage case?" 
Mr. Nelsen: "Yes. There's no question about water 
rights that I can see. It is primarily a damage case." 
There followed considerable discussion that indicated 
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that plaintiff by his amended complaint was trying to 
establish an exclusive right to the use of the barrow pit 
to carry irrigation water and therefore that they wanted 
to prevent the defendant from using the ditch in the bar-
row pit to convey his irrigation water and it may be as-
sumed that if there is a question presented on this issue by 
the appeal it is still our position, it s a legal action to estab-
lish a right to carry water in this ditch or barrow pit, but 
whether legal or equitable, in view of the conflict· in the 
testimony and the fact that the court reached the con-
clusion there would be no flooding where the pipe was not 
dammed higher than to force water to flow five or six 
inches below the top of the pipe in question, after conduct-
ing repeated experiments on the property this court will 
not disturb these findings unless the court find from 
the record they are clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence. 
In the case of Dahnken vs. George Romney & Sons 
Co., 111 Utah 4 71, 184 Pac. 2nd, 211, which was a case in-
volving an easement by prescription, the court says: 
"However, there are in this case no equitable 
issues; therefore, it must be considered as an ac-
tion at law. Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 
994, P 2d 862; Norback v. Board of Directors, 84 
Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339. Our review in law cases is 
limited to the determination of whether or not 
there is competent evidence to support the judg-
ment of the trial court." 
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Counsel in the first sentence of this brief refers to this 
as an injunction suit. This appears to be a hint that this 
court should -review the disputed evidence and make new 
findings based on the testimony of witness favorable to 
the plaintiffs. No authorities are cited for the proposi-
tion and in fact the law of this state is well settled that 
this court will not ordinarily disturb findings of fact of a 
trial by the court where the evidence is in conflict even in 
an equity case: 
Wilcox vs. Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 Pac. 2nd, 
1; Stanley vs. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 Pac. 2nd 
465; :Millard vs. Parry et al, 2 Utah 2nd 217, 271 
Pac. 2nd, 852. 
In the latter case the court states the rule as follows: 
"We think these findings of the trial court are 
sustained by competent evidence and that they 
should not be disturbed. It is a rule of this court 
that even in an equity case in which it has the 
right to review the evidence and makes its own 
findings, it will not disturb a finding of the trial 
court based upon conflcting evidence unless the evi-
dence clearly preponderates against the finding." 
ASSIGNMENT 1 AND 2 
The four assignments of error all seem to raise mere-
ly the question as to whether there is sufficient evidence 
to support the findings of the court. 
The first assignment is that there is no evidence to 
support the finding in 7 that the defendant and his pre-
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decessors in interest used their irrigation waters from a 
ditch taking off from the Swift Slough and coursing north 
through the Stewart property to the defendant's property 
and after the construction of the Railroad making the di-
version from the ditch in the barrow pit into the same 
ditch. 
It is the defendant's contention that the overwhelm-
ing weight of the evidence sustains these findings. In the 
first place the court's repeated viewing of the premises 
showed the old markings of the old abandoned ditch. All 
that the trial court saw might not appear in the record 
but it was referred to on a number of occasions. At Tr 
89 the plaintiff himself started to describe the Hebaus 
ditch but was interrupted by his counsel. He apparently 
did not dispute the ditch being there, but did testify that 
for some years Hebaus did not use the water. Incidently 
that is not important because there is no issue of abandon-
ment of a water right in this case. 
Dr. I. P. Stewart, owner of the land where the ditch 
runs over to the defendant's property, a man past his 
eighties, testified that the Hebaus ditch had been there for 
many years, although he would not try to give the exact 
number (Tr 246). The defendant testified that Mr. He-
baus was watering there through the portions of those 
ditches north of the track in 1921 when he went over there 
with his father. (Tr 276 and 285) He testified Hebaus 
raised grain and alfalfa on this same land he now irrigates 
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and the ditches to the land are substantially the same, but 
the old ditches followed around the high places and now he 
has leveled the land so the ditches are now straight. (Tr 
277). 
The plaintiff, on cross examination, admitted that 
when the Railroad was build the barrow pit on the north 
side of the Railroad was a substitute for carrying water 
that had been flowing to the south and coming down the 
old slough. (Tr 350-51) It is true that the plaintiff at-
tempted to call this barrow pit a drain, but that is not 
very convincing when the slope of the country is to the 
north and west and they used this big dam by the bridge to 
water along the south edge of the meadow. 
This has reference to the water from the Tarbet or 
Blue Spring, also referred to as the Bodrero Spring, which 
arises north of the Railroad; there were other sources aris-
ing south of the Railroad. (Tr 311) The whole theory of 
the trial was that the Railroad made it necessary to change 
the method of irrigating the plaintiffs' property north of 
the track, and this also went for the irrigation of the prop-
erty of the defendant north of the track irrigated from the 
old diversion point at Point "B" on the map. It is not dis-
puted that the defendant's lower or westerly lands continu-
ed to be irrigated through the ditch designated as diverted 
from the Slough at Point "B" on the map. 
After the case had been tried and closed the Railroad 
abandoned their right of way and conveyed by Quit Claim 
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Deed the same to the respective land owners. Plaintiff 
then filed a supplemental pleading in which they sought a 
judgment herein allowing them to turn the waters south 
across the tracks where it went before the Railroad was 
constructed. The defendant replied setting up that the 
old ditch from the Swift Slough over to their ditch on the 
north side of the Railroad had been abandoned and not 
used for more than 40 years. The plaintiffs wanted to re-
store the water to be turned back to the old Swift Slough, 
but on inquiry from the court they were not willing to 
agree to restore the abandoned ditch from the Swift Slough 
to defendant's ditch, (Tr 367 -68) and at Tr 433: 
"THE COURT: In other words you make no 
tender now to provide another route?" 
"MR. YOUNG: No." 
There was a rather extended conference between coun-
sel and the court about the matter. No one suggested the 
old ditch had not been there but the question was raised 
that the plaintiffs did not own the land upon which the old 
ditch existed south of the Railroad. 
Mr. Waterson testified that he remembered where the 
old ditch took off from the Swift Slough, that there was 
still some marks of the old ditch left; (Tr 402) and then 
that ditch took off where Cowleys had an old ditch (ap-
proximately Point "B" on the map) and ran for a ways 
through the Cowley or Smart place down to the Stewart 
property and then north to the defendant's property. (Tr 
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403-4) He also testified the old ditch had never been used 
south of· the Railroad since that time but they had always 
used the ditch on the north of the Railroad. 
The trial court was not impressed apparently with this 
application to turn the water back to the south and enter-
ed judgment accordingly. 
What has already been said in effect also answers the 
Assignment No.2 as to the manner of the dam on the pipe. 
The plaintiff admitted he took the half dam used by the 
defendant for several years and produced it after cross exa-
mination at the trial. The defendant admitted that he 
placed a piece of tin that covered the entire end of the 
pipe for a day or two in June, 1953, but it was his claim that 
there was never enough water to reach the top of the cul-
vert. This was contradicted by plaintiff. The court re-
solved it in favor of the plaintiff and allowed damages for 
this occurance. Plaintiff conceded he did not want to raise 
the water to the top of the pipe and much of the latter part 
of the hearing was taken up by the plaintiff contending the 
ditch to the west had been lowered so the water would not 
go to the top of the pipe, in which case it was physically a 
fact that it would not flood plaintiffs' land. Defendant 
offered to consent to a provision in the decree that he had 
no right to raise the water to the top of the pipe and the 
court offered to give the plaintiff an injunction against 
raising the water above a point 6 inches below the top of the 
pipe, but plaintiffs declined the injunction, apparently upon 
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the theory it would do them no good since the ditch had 
been lowered and would not now flood their land. (Tr 
445-47). 
ASSIGNMENT NO. 3 FINDING NO. 10 
The third assignment is that the court erred in hold-
ing that the use of the ditch in the barrow pit was adverse 
and under claim of right. It may be true that the plaintiff 
was not asked to give his conclusion, that he used it ad-
versly and under claim of right, etc. Bqt the facts are 
clearly established that he did so use it continuously. That 
he had no other way to get the water to use his land and 
whenever 1vir. Cowley asserted a right to remove the dam 
from the pipe, Mr. Watterson, in no uncertain terms, an-
nounced his claim of rights; (Tr 284) and that Mr. Cowley 
knew defendant was claiming the right, was testified to by 
Cmvley when he stated that when he observed Watterson 
approaching the culvert, he, Cowley, got on his horse and 
rode away. (Tr 108). It is interesting to here remark that 
when Cowley told Watterson he was flooding Cowley's 
land, Watterson asked him to show him where it was flood-
ing over Cowley's land but Cowley declined to do so. (Tr 
283). In fact no one testified anywhere in this record that 
they observed the water flooding out of the barrow pit al-
though plaintiff did testify the water did back up and flood 
an entire 20 acres. 
That the defendant and his predecessors in interest 
acquired an easement against the Railroad Company in the 
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barrow pit for carrying his water by prescription, is well 
settled in this state. Holm vs. Davis, 41 Utah 200, 125 
Pacific 403. This is the case that established the law for 
this state for canals and ditches in the following langu-
age: 
"If such were not the law, then in this state, 
in view of the arid character of the land embraced 
within its borders, but few irrigating ditches could 
now be maintained. This is apparent to all, for the 
reason that in many if not most instances such 
ditches were at least in part constructed over lands 
owned by others either with the express or implied 
permission or consent of the owners thereof. If the 
owners of lands over which ditches have been thus 
constructed can now claim, as is claimed by respon-
dent, that the owners and users of those ditches 
have acquired no right to maintain them for the 
reason that the ditches or canals were in fact con-
structed with the consent of the original owners of 
the lands, and hence the ditch owners are mere 
licensees, and their ditches, flumes, and canals are 
maintained and used only by the sufferance or in-
dulgence of the landowners, then the law has proved 
to be a mere delusion and a snare. In settling and 
reclaiming the arid lands much that in early days 
was deemed entirely worthless has now acquired 
considerable value. Over such lands miles of 
ditches, flumes, and canals were constructed with 
either the express or implied consent of the own-
ers thereof. Can such owners, after a lapse of all 
these years, now treat the owners of the ditches as 
mere trespassers? We think not. Upon the other 
hand, we are of the opinion that, although a canal, 
ditch, or flume may have been constructed by a 
person on or over lands owned by another with the 
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consent or permission of such other owner, yet, if 
the owner of the canal, ditch, or flume, or his as-
signee, has used and maintained the same in the 
same manner as if the same were constructed over 
his own lands, and where such use and maintenance 
has continued uninterruptedly and under claim of 
right for more than twenty years, in such event the 
owner of the ditch has acquired a right to use and 
maintain tr.e same perpetually as an easement." 
"The fact, therefore, that the canal was on the 
land and was being used for the purposes aforesaid 
was notice to the respondent that it was a structure 
of a permanent character used for purposes per-
manent in their nature, and hence he purchased the 
land subject to the rights of the owner of the canal. 
If the right to use the same, therefore, had ripened 
into a prescriptive right by the lapse of time and 
the character of its use, respondent purchased and 
holds the land subject to appellant's right to main-
tain and use the canal for tl:!e purposes for which it 
was constructed, maintained, and used from its in-
ception.'' 
The case has often been cited for the proposition that 
in cases where the easement has been used for 20 years as 
though it was the property of the user it is presumed to 
be adverse and the burden is upon the owner of the seru-
ient estate to prove the use was by consent. There is no 
evidence that this use in this case was by the consent of 
the Railroad as a mere temporary license. 
The case of Zollinger vs. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 Pac. 
2nd 714, applied the above law to a right of way for a 
i'oadway. This is the case frequently cited for the proposi-
tion that adverse use means use "against" the owner of 
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the servient estate rather than "under" such owner. The 
court quotes from Arrwrican Jurisprudence on Easements 
and then says: 
"We think the better rule is that described as 
the prevailing rule in the above quotation. That is, 
where a claimant has shovm an open and continu-
ous use of the land for the prescriptive period (20 
years in Utah) the use will be presumed to have 
been against the owner and the owner of the serv-
ient estate to prevent the prescriptive easement 
from arising has the burden of showing that the 
use was under him instead of against him." 
The court then holds that the Frank case does not 
come within the rule that "the road was opened by the 
landowner for his own use," in which case the burden as 
to consent is different. 
There is no question of the Railroad building this ditch 
in the barrow pit for its own use. It was constructed so 
that it would carry off the water that had formerly cross-
ed over where the railroad was built and used by the ir-
rigators to irrigate their lands in lieu of the old ditch. The 
Railroad had no interest in the water for railroad purposes. 
Dahnken vs. Romney, 111 Utah 4 71, 184 Pac. 2nd 211, 
Utah 194 7, is a later Utah case quoting the above rules 
from the Frank case and applying them to the use of right 
of way. 
The rule that the burden is upon the claimant to show 
his use was expressly adverse in cases where the ditch was 
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constructed by the owner of the land for its own use ap-
plied in the case cited by appellant of Griffiths vs. Archi-
bald (by a divided court), 2 Utah 2nd, 293, 272, Pac. 2nd 
586 was not applied in the Frank case and is not applicable 
in t~:e case at bar. 
Board of Directors of Turlock Irrigation District vs. 
City of Ceres, (Calif. 1953) 254 Pac. 2nd 907, is a typical 
case sustaining an easement in an open ditch. In that case 
the court, quoting other California cases, said: 
"Accordingly, it has been held in this state that 
where an open and uninterrupted use of easement 
fer a sufficient length of time to create the pre-
sumption of a grant is shown, the law will presume 
the elements of hostile intent, and that the use is 
adverse and under a claim of right. Franz c. Men-
donca, 131 Cal. 205, 63 P. 361; Fleming v. Howard, 
150 Cal. 28, 87 P. 908; Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 
6677, 66 P. 10. If the other party relies upon the 
fact that these acts were permissive or in the na-
ture of a license, or merely given as a matter of ac-
commodation, it is incumbent upon him to rebut 
the presumption of a non-appearing grant. Other-
wise the presumption stands as sufficient proof and 
establishes the right." 
If there should be some doubt about the adverse char-
acter of the defendant's use of this ditch, that would not 
be a reversible error in this case because the judgment 
does not rely entirely on an easement by adverse use. The 
old ditch was cut off by the Railroad Company and a new 
one provided by them, and this new one was used by the 
defendant and his predecessors in interest for approximate-
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ly 40 years until this controversy arose and the trial court. 
in rendering his decision, announced that it made little 
difference on what ground the right to use the ditch was 
founded whether by exchange, adverse use, or estoppel; 
(Tr 435) the defendant under the circumstances is clearly 
entitled to use the ditch to convey his decreed water. There 
was no showing of any facts which would legally deprive 
the defendant of ditch rights in which to convey -his water 
decreed to his predecessors in interest and used by them 
for so many years. It is true the plaintiff in a sort of left-
handed manner attempted to testify that Hebaus did not 
use the water for some years, but he was so indefinite in 
his testimony as to time and amount, or as to opportunity 
to observe the facts, that it could not possibly be stretched 
into a finding that the water rights had been legally aban-
doned. 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
The fourth assignment seems to be an argument that 
the court should have awarded more damages. We believe 
this subject has already been fully covered. The almost 
conclusive evidence in this case was to the effect that the 
water would not run out of the barrow pit onto plaintiffs' 
lands as a result of placing the partial dam over the pipe. 
'rhe preponderance of evidence was likewise well estab-
lished that when the ditch was cleaned out, (lowered, as 
described by plaintiff), he would not be flooded and coun-
sel admitted an injunction against him would do no good. 
( Tr 4--! 5) The evidence being in conflict, the court should 
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not disturb the judgment for damages. The defendant did 
not appeal from the judgment for damages in the interest 
of ending this long drawn out litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, that the defendant is the 
owner of his decreed water rights, which in no way inter-
fere with the water rights of the plaintiffs; that the ac-
quiring of the easement to use the barrow pit is good and 
valid on all three theories of, exchange, adverse use, and 
estoppel; these rights were acquired against the Railroad 
who changed the old irrigation system when they con-
structed the railroad; tl:e plaintiffs are in no better posi-
tion than the railroad by reason of recently acquiring a 
quit claim deed from the Railroad. 
They refused to restore the old system which the 
Railroad would have had to do, to avoid the easement on 
the right of way. It is not conceded they would have a 
right to do that without the consent of the defendant. 
Plaintiff has no valid theory of any kind to interfere with 
defendant's water rights which were acquired entirely in-
dependent of the plaintiffs, and which plaintiffs have no 
right to confiscate or destroy, and under these circum-
stances, the judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRESTON & HARRIS, 
Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent 
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